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TO THE READER.
writer of the following pages proposes to examine
the probable effect of Southern Independence upon some
of the vital material interests of the North. He trusts
that this examination, while it may illustrate the value of
the Union, will also show the importance of united action
among ourselves to secure its permanence. His earnest
desire is to prove how intensely practical a thing American nationality is, and he will not hesitate to condemn,
with equal frankness, the extreme views of either party,
when they seem to him to conflict with its developement.
THE

PHILADELPHIA,

February, 1863.

~~_!)!_:right secured, according to Act of Congress.

WE have now reached a period in the progress of
the war when the prospect before · us, in one aspect
at least, is clear and unmistakable. M.any of us
have been from the beginning groping our way
through mists and darkness, uncertain where that
way might lead us, and fondly hoping that the
rising sunlight would dispel the dim phantom of
ill-omen which had haunted our footsteps during
our dreary journey. But alas! while that sunlight
may have chased away the phantom, it has revealed
in its place a monster of more "hideous mien," proclaiming in open and defiant tones the deliberate
purpose of our enemies to establish on our borders
an independent, foreign, and necess;1rily hostile
power.
/
We confess that we have been long in coming to
the belief that the southern people were in earnest
in hoping to carry out a scheme so extraordinary.
It seemed necessary to deny to them the possession
of an ordinary share of good sense and common

6

NORTHERN INTERESTS AND

foresight, to suppose that they could really expect
to establish permanently such a government, or that
they really believed that the people of the North
could by any possible combinations ever be made
to consent to it. This hesitation, which has been
shared by many, has unquestionably served much to
weak.en the enthusiasm with which, otherwise, the
war would have been constantly supported. But
there can be room for doubt no longer. It would
be waste of time to examine all the declarations of
the rebels on this point, but from the course malignity of the Richmond newspapers, to the vulgar
mendacity of Mr. Davis's speech at Jackson, they
all agree in this,-that the inflexible purpose of the
leaders at the South is, to establish, if they cart, a
great independent slave power on this continent,
and that to render such a power safe and strong,
every State which has the bad taste or the bad
policy to prohibit slavery within its borders, must
on that account be denied any participation in such
a government, and that ahy theory of reconstruction
or reconciliation, based on constitutional guarantees,
-even one which would secure the services of the
whole population of the North as slaves, according
to the Richmonq newspapers-must be abandoned
hopeless.
This, at any rate, has the merit of simplifying the
matter very much. Only consider how anxiously we
have endeavoured to find out the grievances of the

as

SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE.

7

South which were so intolerable as to justify them,
on any principle which has governed mankind at
other times, in rushing into a revolution; how manr
of us have tried every species of conciliation, and
have promised guarantees for their future safety, if
the people would only return to their duty; how
some have gone even further, and presumed to offer
up New England as a sacrific~ to- appease this
ins~tiable Moloch. But it has all been to no purpose. The South has turned a deaf ear to the
charmer, "charm he never so wisely." The rebels
have in turn been bullied, beaten, st;uved, and beggared by one party; and flattered, caressed, encouraged, and tempted with fine promises 'by the other;
but to each party they have held precisely the same
language-that of stubborn, defiant insult. No;
the insane pride of the slaveholder. still cherishes
the dre.am of that perfect civilization in which
slavery is to be really the corner-stone of the
republic, in which every power which can moulc;l.
the form of government, and every theory which can
guide and control its action, shall be due to the
pure and unmix~d influence of the slave system
upon the man and the citizen. Their future association with us would destroy this qarling theory,
not because we are anti-slavery in our opinions, but
simply because nature and our position h;we unhappily forced us to be non-slaveholding. They glory,
therefore, in being aliens and foreigners, and t~ey
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present to us the most singular spectacle of a people
saved from utter annihilation, simply because a large
party in the country with which they are at war
refuse to take them at their word.
We cannot, we wish we could, refuse the evidence of our own senses in this matter. The
question is no longer whether we shall restore the
Union upon any terms, or by any possible theory
of reconstruction, not even whether the war is carried on upon principles, and with certain indications
of a policy which we may not all approve, but it
seems to us that it is narrowed down to this,
whether our own permanent peace and security do
not require us to crush effectually a scheme, which
would establish on our borders an independent
sovereignty.
Let us look fairly at the portentous significance
of the project before us, and reflect upon the inevitable consequences to our own safety and peace
if it should be successful. This is no mere sentimental nor speculative matter. It has nothing to
do with our pride in preserving the integrity of our
national existence in the eyes of the world, nothing
to do with any mere philanthropic feelings.in regard
to the condition of the slaves, but it addresses itself
to our deepest instincts, to considerations connected
with the value and safety of our property, •with our_
love of peace, and with all our hopes of the future,
as those .hopes are bound up in the belief of our
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capacity for developing our natural resources. Every
man in the free States who owns a dollar's worth of
property, or who has the smallest belief in the value
of free institutions, is as much interested in the settlement of this matter, as if it were proposed to place
the territory, which ~he South now claims, under the
absolute sovereignty of England, France, or Russia.
There is no middle ground. It can no longer be
disguised that the rebels have determined to establish, if they can, two separate nations out of the
common territory, and that no concessions we can
make, no securities we can offer, nothing but the
irresistible power of a victorious army can change
their purpose.
This is the issue we have to meet, plain and
unmistakable, and it does really seem as if it had
been forced upon us just at this crisis, by the direct
interposition of Divine Providence, to recall that
united and generous enthusiasm with .which this
con test was first entered upon, and to rouse into
efficient action that deep, common, universal instinct
of the American heart-i.ts intense nationality, which
has only been slumbering of late, because it feared
misdirection. In the legitimate influence of this
sentiment is our sure ground of hope. Let us not
forget th~t in all the angry discussions about the
policy of the war, while the theory of one party may
be called that of conciliation, and that of the other,
coercion, the avowed object of both has been the
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same-the restoration of the Union. The Demo9ratic party has hoped against hope, profoundly convinced of the inestimable value of the Union, and
fondly believing that a policy of concession would
secure its restoration. This i~ observable in all its
public acts, and even in the avowals of those who
are supposed by many to entertain very extreme
views on the subject of concession. These opinions
~re only the outgrowth of that common sentiment of
American nationality, which is powerful with them
in common with men of all parties. That this nation shall be ONE, no matter at what cost of pride
or principle, is their inmost desire. No one conspicuous in that party, so far as we know, with a
single exception, to which we shall refer hereafter,
has ever favoured the scheme of southern independence. On the contrary, Governor Seymour, Mr.
Van Buren, or Mr. Charles Ingersoll, are quite as
decided on this point as Mr. Lincoln himsel£ Mr.
Ingersoll, fn a recent speech, remarkable not less
for the sagacity with which he exposes the folly of
this dream of southern independence-a theory, as
he truly says, tenable only in connection with a
perpetual war-than for the frankness with which
he predicts the consequences, tells his southern
friends, that if ,they have really made up their
minds to persist in such a scheme, that the North,
of all parties, must necessarily become a unit against
them and their slave system, and that their ulti-
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mate ruin must then become inevitable. These a.re
opinions which must sooner or later be forced· upon
thinking men of all parties, when they are convinced of the hopelessness of conciliating the South;
and the alternative is presented, whether we are to
protect our own nearest, home interests, by forcing
these people to submit at any cost, or whether, on
the other hand, we are to allow them to establish
themselves in quiet and undisturbed possession of
a powerful sovereignty on our borders.
For let .us reflect what this project of southern
independence really means. To enumerate only
some of the more obvious results, it includes, on the
part of the North, the abandonment of Chesapeake
Bay, with Fortress Monroe, its guardian at its outlet;
the possession, by our enemies, of all the forts on
the southern coast, including those at Key ,Vest,
the Tortugas, and Pensacola, by means of which the
safety of the whole commerce of the North with the
West Indies, South America, and California, would
be jeopardized; it requires the secure protection of
a frontier of more than fifteen hundred miles in
length; it places the navigation of our great rivers,
and especially that of the Mississippi, under such
control as might be arranged by treaty with a jealous
foreign power; and more than all, and perhaps. worse
than all, it takes away wholly the power of resisting
the encroachments of European powers, who,, either·
in alliance with the South, or taking advantage of
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its hatred against us, would certainly not fail in any
future war to attack us -in that quarter which these
proposed arrangements would render wholly defenceless. If the success of our enemies is to lead to
such results, we may be pretty confident that when
the matter is fully understood, there will be but one
party at the North-the commonest instinct of selfpreservation will make us a unit.
Let us look, then, at this subject from a point of
view whence it seems to us it has not been sufficiently considered. Let us turn our •eyes away
from the South, and forget for a moment that the
war is waged to restore the Union, or to force rebels
foto submission. Let us look at home, at the North,
and ask ourselves, what would be the consequences
to us, to our peace, security, or prosperity, if we
should falter in this great contest. Let us examine
the four great pillars, which support the whole
edifice ·of northern prosperity, so far as that prosperity can ·be affected by the action of a government-the -free navigation of the rivers,-the secu·r ity of our foreign commerce,-unrestricted inland
communication -and intercourse,-and safety against
foreign invasion, and see how long they are likely
to remain standing, if this dream of southern inde·pendence is realized.
The very first idea which suggests itself to the
niind in connection with the notion of an indepenclent sovereignty, is that fruitful source of the long-
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est and bloodiest wars on record in niodern times, a
long and qposed boundary line. We do not know
that the project of independence is sufficiently developed to enable us to say where the proposed bound-ary line is to run; but be it a river or an imaginary
· line, it must be more than fifteen hundred miles
long. If we follow the practice of European naHons,
a practice the result of necessity, we must, for our
own safety, protect the whole of this line by fortresses. Consider, too, the constant daily irritation
arising along the whole of this frontier, owing to
mutual jealousies, differing custom-house regulations, and more than all, from that prolific source
of trouble, the existence of slavery on one side of
the line, and its prohibition on the other. There is
a strange theory that there is more likely to be
mutual respect in the relations of inhabitants of
independent nations, than in those of a people who
are kept in unwilling subjection to the same rule.
vVe are pointed to the hatred of the Irish to the
English, of the Magyars to the Austrians, of the
Italians to the Germans; but if we will recall
the feelings of the Greeks to the Turks, of the
Belgians to the Dutch, of the Portuguese to the
Spaniards, or of the Swiss to the Austrians, we
shall discover that the cause of this antipathy lies
deeper than a dislike to a common government, and
must be sought for in the far more radical differences which arise from an irreconcilable hostility of

•
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race and religion. History, alas! lends no support
to any such theory. It teaches, on th~ contrary,
that "enmity between contending nations is implacable and venomous, just in the same degree as they
have previously stood near each other, or as nature
intended the relation of good will to exist between
them. It is the secret of all civil and religious
wars; it is the secret of divided families; it is the
explanation of unrelenting hatred between those
who were once bosom friends. Our position would
be but the repetitian of the Peloponn~sian war, or
of the German Thirty Years' war, with still greater
bitterness between us, because it would be far more
unnatural." _C~n we look calmly at these thing-s,
and not feel that a war of twenty years' duration,
which would at last teach both parties that their
only safety lay in Union, would be preferable to
evils so intolerable 1 Can we consent to owe our,
safety to a triple line of fortresses, like that which
protects France from invasion on the side of Germany and Belgium 1 or rather can we doubt that
the North, with any such prospect before ~t, would
become an ~' indissoluble unit," and strike down, at
any cost, and with overwhelming force, those who
set up this monsfrous pretension 1
If it were possible that, from any motive, or from
any possible combination of events in the future,
we might yield to such a claim, we would not gain,
by thus sacrificing our i·eal interests and our honour,
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even that poor substitute-peace. If we look at
the history of modern Europe, and seek for one
word to define the character of the wars which have
desolated the continent for the last century and a
half, we may most properly call them wars for a
frontier. All the passions which have driven men
to war in the old world, find at last their expression
iu the desire to obtain a good frontier, a safe protection against the ambition of their neighbours.
,vhat, for instance, was the object of the wars in
'which the Prince of Orange was engaged in the
Low Countries, but to secure a barrier for h1s native
country against the power of :France 1 What were
the campaigns of Marlboro?gh but efforts to gain
posses·sion of the fortresses of Belgium, and thus
protect the dominion of the Emperor of Germany
in that country against the ambition of the same
power 1 What was Frederick the Great's seizure
of Silesia, but a desire to render . the frontier of
Prussia safe against Austria and Russia 1 What, in
more modern times, was the grand object of the
early wars of the French Revolution, but to obtain
what they call their- natural frontiers, the Rhine, the
Alps, and the Pyrenees 1 ·what cost N apo°leon his
first abdication, but his obstinate refusal to give up
this very boundaryl What, in our own day, has
lost Lombardy to· Austria, but her persistence in
interfering in the Italian Duchies, with a view of
rendering her frontier safe against Sardinia 1 and
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what has been the result of the war which grew out
of these pretensions, but to make the French dream
of a frontier of the maritime Alps a reality 1 In
the old and settled monarchies of Europe, if one
thing could be supposed to be permanently established, after so many ages of strife, it might be supposed that that one thing was the boundaries of the
respective states. Yet, notwithstanding all the
wars, and all the treaty stipulations by which diplomatists have fondly believed that these disputes
had been finally adjusted, these boundaries become
as shifting as the sand, when the whirlwind of
human passion bursts forth, and the sword is made
the arbiter of the destiny of nations. The fortresses
which line every frontier on the continent of Europe
are among the most suggestive objects which the
·thoughtful student meets with on his travels.
, vhile they tell of religion menaced, of independence preserved, of ambition curbed, they are also
enduring monuments of a truth which lies deep in
human history,-that no nation has ever been willing to trust its safety to the influence of those sentiments of good will and mutual respect which are
supposed to arise from free commercial intercourse
and identity of material interests, but has felt secure
only when girded about with the strongest physical
barriers against the violence of human passions.
If then, a boundary line could be agreed upon in
this country, it does not seem practicable to adopt
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the European plan of maintaining it, and it would
thus be at ·the mercy of every outbreak of the bordering population. Even if this was escaped, q uestions connected with it would be constantly arising,
and it needs no prophet to predict, that they would
be seized upon by any party, or by any ambitiou~
general of ability, (and it is to be supposed that at
some future day the American soil may produce such
a personage, although certainly it has been uncommonly niggardly hitherto in this respect,) as pretexts
to involve the two countries in a general war. There
is a vast deal of practical good sense at the bottom
of the theory of American nationality,-the instinctive feeling that this country must be one. Its first
introduction into American politics was under the
auspices of a very wise and eminently practical man,
to whose counsels American independence owes perhaps as much as to those of any other one manDr. Franklin. It is not generally known, but it is a
fact now well vouched for, that at the first meeting of the Commissioners in Paris, to settle upon
the terms of the Treaty of _1783, Dr. Franklin
proposed that England should cede the whole of
Canada to the United States, with a view, as he
stated, of preventing the possibility of any future
disputes between rival powers on this continent.
His anxiety to secure an early peace, and the great
victory of Rodney over the Count de Grasse, by
which the French fleet in the \Vest Indies was
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destroyed, occurring just at this time, probably
deterred him from further urging this project,
which had been a favourite one with him at least
as early as the year 1778. ·what would have been
our position now, had this grand idea been then
carried into execution 1
Another problem closely connected with the
question of boundaries, and, perhaps, even more difficult of practical solution on the theory of southern independence, is the enjoyment of the navigation of the great rivers, which, rising in the
free States, run so long a p:ortion of their course
in the southetn territory. It is hardly necessary
to say a word ~1pon the inestimable value of these
great channels of communication to the prosperity
of the ten millions of freemen, who are now asked
to hold so dear a right at the sufferance of those
for whose use, in common with themselves, that
right was originally secured. We may refer to it
merely to remind the reader that the free navigation of the Mississippi river to its mouth, has been
necessarily from the beginning the central idea of
all western progress, as the river itself has been the
main· artery along which has fl.owed hitherto the rich
stream of its happy and prosperous life. Its indispensable value to all western developement was
seen at the earliest period of the history of the government, and strenuous efforts were made to secure
as free a navigation of the river as was consistent

SOUTHERN INDEPENDENCE:

19

with the possession of the territory through which it
flowed, by the Crown of Spain. By a treaty made
in 1 795, a precarious right of navigation and deposit
at New Orleans was obtained, and this was considered at the time as a most important advantage
gained for the interests of the ,vest. Happily for
us, France, who had succeeded to the Spanish dominion of the country, from a jealous fear lest England might wrest this immense territory from her,
thought fit to sell the magnificent prize to us, and
Mr.Jefferson, with far-seeing sagacity, eagerly seized
the opportunity of acquiring it; thus, as Mr. Everett
expresses it, "violating the Constitution, but founding an empire."
From that day to this, the value of this acquisition
has become more and more real and apparent. Into
that magnificent domain, tempted by the boundless
prospect of success of which the free navigation of
the rivers was the surest guaranty, the ceaseless tide
of emigration has poured, bringing with it the varying forms of modern civilization, and a people has
grown up, enterprising, active, intelligent, persevering, blessed with marvellous prosperity, and
happy in the enjoyment of all the arts of peace.
The people of the East have watched the progress
of their western brethren with a wonder and admiration which has been shared by all the world, and
have looked forward with complacency to the- period
when these great and prosperous communities, the
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free States of the Valley of the Mississippi, developing to the fullest extent all the wonderful resources of their position, should become the centre
and stronghold of our characteristic American civilization. Can any one suppose that this powerful
race, with such a career before them, can tamely
submit to the abandonment of this glori_ous heritage, or can consent to hold, at the pleasure of a
foreign power, that unrestricted commercial intercourse, which has been the foundation of all its
past prosperity, as it is the basis of all its hopes
for the future. Certainly, to state such a proposit ion is to demonstrate its absurdity.
The force of these truths is so apparent that it
has penetrated even the minds of those, who, in
their revolutionary fury, seem to have forgotten the
,elementary distinctions between right and wrong,
and the rebel Congress, we are told, has declared
that the navigation of the Mississippi shall be free.
In other words, it is proposed, when southern inde~
pendence is recognised, to substitute for the free,
common, unrestricted use of the. great river, as
now guaranteed by the Constitution of the United
-States, a treaty with a foreign power, by which the
country shall ·be equally well secured in its enjoyment. Now, in the first place we may ask, in view of
t he permanent security of the right, where is there
any guaranty that .a treaty will be regarded as more
binding than -the provisions of the Constitution
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itself which, in one sense, is the most solemn of
all treaties l "\iVhat does the proposition amount to,
when stripped of the false importance which some
persons, who certainly do not get their ideas from
history, attach to the notion of a treatyl Simply
this, that the country is to hold this great outlet
for her productions at the mercy of a foreign power,
and that that power thus holding the very keys of
her treasury, may starve her into compliance with
any claim it may deem proper to make. But it is
said, mutual interest and the laws of trade will
settle this matter, the obvious material interests of
both countries requiring unrestricted commercial
intercourse. All this was eminently true when the
jealousies and rivalries of different States in regard
to the use of the river, had a common umpire in
the Federal Government. But alas! this fearful
rebellion has shown that when human passions are
roused, material interests, like moral laws, are alike
unheeded.
Could we afford to trust this precious jewel in
the keeping of the weakest and most pacific foreign
power in existence 1 Its possession would infallibly
give to any power the control of the destinies of the
continent, and what would it be in the hands of
that brave and turbulent race, whom Mr. Russell
(the correspondent of the Times) describes as pos-sessing,-not the wisdom of the serpent, combined ,
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with the harmlessness of the dove, but "the simplicity of children, with the ferocity of tigers."
The first essential to all successful commerce, is
a sense of security arising from the consciousness
_ of adequate protection in case of need. But what
safety could there be to commerce when any line
of policy which we might adopt, should be judged
by such a population to be hostile 1 And how long
would the voice of justice or moderation be heeded,
when a foreign power had at command so formidable an engine for our destruction 1 No doubt, in
the event of a separation, a treaty might be framed
by which the erection of forts on the banks of the
river might be prohibited; but, of course, such a
stipulation would become inoperative the moment
war was declared, although that is the only period
when any such arrangement would be of the slightest importance to us.
There is another consideration, showing how
impossible it would be to secure the free navigation
of the great rivers, on the theory of southern independence; and that is, that in such an event, it is
manifest that the political necessity for the control
of the rivers to the very existence of the prnposed
government, would outweigh any question of their
mere commercial value, great as it unquestionably is.
It is not worth while to ·argue this point, for it
must be clear that no government at the South could
surrender, or consent to weaken, in any way, so forr
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midable a means of controlling the action of a powerful neighbour. It would thus appear that the only
alternative in this matter lies between the total
abandonment of any real and substantial control
over it, and a determination that the right shall be
secured, as it now is, by the provisions of the Conould it not be better, in view of these
stitution.
things, that we should fight the matter out now, and
settle for ever, who are to be the slaves, and who
the masters, if that is the only practical alternative 1
,ve cannot help feeling that when our people fully
consider the proposition to confide th·e control of
the Mississippi river to a foreign power, a project
now veiled under the thin and transparent pretext
of a guaranty of its free navigation, they are as
likely to assent to it, as to return to the practice
of paying a tribute to the Dey of Algiers for protection against his own piratical corsairs.
There is a good deal of misapprehension in some
minds as to the peculiar sanctity of provisions in
public treaties in regard to the free navigation of
rivers. It is supposed that there is something
exceptional in their character, which gives them a
more permanent existence than the other stipulations of a treaty. This is so far from being true,
that the principles which now govern this matter
were introduced into the public law of Europe as
late as the year 1814, when the doctrine of the
right of the free 1:avigation of the great rivers in

,v
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E urope, in time of peace, was first recognised by the
Congress of Vienna. It is true that this is the
only addition to the law of nations, among the many
which were made by that great assemblage of European diplomatists which has survived to our own
day; but the reason is, that no general war has
arisen on the continent between powers mutually
interested in the subject, ( except, perhaps, the dispute about the mouths of the Danube, which was
one of the causes of the Crimean war,) so as to bring
the matter again into discussion. But we may be
sure that while Ehrenbreitstein and Cologne command the Rhine, Antwerp the Scheldt, Mantua the
Po, Magdeburg the Elbe, and the fortifications of
Lintz the Danube, a war behveen parties mutually
interested in the navigation of these great rivers
would not terminate without giving decided advantage to that nation whose power, resulting from the
strength and position of its fortifications, could control their course. We must nqt forget that the
practical question with us is, not how the right of
naviga.tion is to be secured during a time of peace,
for then, as with the air we breathe, it is of interest
to no one to interfere with its enjoyment; but how
far, in time of war, its control mjght embarrass our
operations, or force us into humiliating ·concessions.
The question was settled by the Congress of Vienna,
as a matt.e r of general European concern, and the
arrangement was guaranteed by all the power'"'.
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This is precisely the position in which the government of the United States stands in regard to the
Mississippi and all our great navigable rivers, so far
as the right of every citizen of any State to use
them as channels of trade, is concerned. It has
neither power nor temptation to grant peculiar
privileges to any section, and is only desirous of
:developing, to the fullest extent, their great value
for the convenience of all. This is the only substantial guaranty we can ever have for the permanent enjoyment of these great arteries ?f civilization,
and the proposition of a would-be foreign power to
allow us to use our own, as its interests or passions
may dictate, is a miserable mockery and insult.
If we wish to know what the great "\Vest would
think of such a scheme, let us listen to its true
voice, as it comes to us in the trumpet tones of
noble Rosecrans, rousing the very depths of the
soul. "We know that such a blessing as peace is
not possible while the unjust and arbitrary power
of the rebel leaders confronts and threatens us.
Crafty as the fox, cruel as the tiger, they cried 'no
coercion,' while preparing to strike us. Bully like,1
they proposed to fight us, because they said they
were able · to whip five to one; and now, when
driven back, they whine out 'no invasion,' and pro-mise us of the West permission to navigate the Mississippi, if we will be 'good boys,' and do as they
bid us. ,vhenever they have the power, they drive
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before them into the ranks, the southern people, and
they would also drive us. Trust them not. \Vere
they able, they would invade and destroy us without
mercy. Absolutely assured of these things, I am
amazed that any one could think of 'peace on any
terms.' He who entertains the sentiment is fit
only to be a slave; he who utters it at this time,
is, moreover, a traitor to his country, who deserves
the scorn and contempt of all honourable men."
The whole theory of the binding force of treaties,
which it is proposed to substitute for the control of
the Constitution over the varying interests of the
country, and the notion which prevails with some,
that peace and security are the better maintained by
treaty provisions than in any other wa,y, seem to
us very singular, very great delusions. They certainly find no support in history. V{ e have only to
study the map of Europe for the last century and a
half, to discover that general treaties of peace, so far
from being any expression of the real interests of the
inhabitants of contending nations, represent only
the concessions on one side, rendered necessary
by the irresistible argument of victory on the other;
and that, even in cases where mutual exhaustion
would have seemed to counsel mutual concessions,
the slightest military advantage, like the sword of
Brennus, has been sure to incline the scale. Treaties based on such principles, where the force of the
moment, and not the eternal laws of justice and
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equity, determine, cannot, in the nature of things,
last longer than the pressure of that force remains.
How many times has the map of Europe been
wholly remodelled since the beginning of the last
century, as the result of wars, arising from alleged
violations of the most solemn treaties, whose provisions had been guaranteed by all the powers. It
is a lamentable fact, that neither prince nor people
has ever been restrained, (when either has had the
power,) by any provisions of treaties• of the most
formal kind, from dealing with their neighbours in
any way which their interests, or ambition, or love
of conquest might prompt. The glory of our own
system has been, that these disputes, which are
inevitable between populations of differing interests,
and which, in other countries, have been made the
constant pretext for war, have here been submitted
to the jurisdiction of the General Government,
under the provisions of the Constitution; and if that
Constitution is destined now to perish, stricken
down by parricidal hands, the fact that for seventy
years it kept the peace between rival and jealous
sovereignties, if it did nothing else for the general
progress of humanity, will always render it the most
remarkable plan of government in human history.
Let us reflect a moment upon what we have
escaped in this country, merely of the evils of war,
by peing bound together by a Constitution, and not
by treaties. Let us look abroad, at the fearful
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experience of Europe under a system which it is
proposed we shall now adopt, and be thankful for
the past, and wise for the future.
No sooner was the treaty of -Utrecht signed in
1713, by which all the advantages which had been
gained by England, in the campaigns of Marlborough, were given up by Bolingbroke, who, as
the event proved, while Minister of Queen Anne,
was also the agent of the Pretender and friend of
Louis XIV., than intrigues began in various courts
of Europe to set aside its provisions. Spain, under
the guidance of that rµost remarkable man, Cardinal
Alberoni, although the recognition of Philip as her
sovereign was almost the only condition of the
treaty likely to remain permanent, became dissatisfied with her abandonment of her Italian possessions, and declared war against the house of
Austria, to recover them . . This, of course, at once
set Europe in a blaze, which was not extinguished
until the overwhelming force of the Quadruple
Alliance enabled it once more to carve up the
continent at the pleasure of its members. Pure
exhaustion kept the nations quiet, until Frederick
. the Great, ambitious to enlarge his territory, not
having the fear of treaties before his eyes, and
thinking that he had only three women, Catherine
of Russia, Maria Theresa, and Madame de Pompadour, to oppose his schemes of conquest, plunged
Europe into a war \Yhich lasted more than seven
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years, and certainly destroyed the lives of more
than a million of men. The result of it all was
that Silesia became a Prussian instead of an Austrian province. So with the famous treaty of Paris
in 1763, after another long war, in which the real
object was doubtless, on the part of England, wholly
to destroy the maritime power of France, new
arrangements were made in regard to the territorial
possessions of the different powers, not only in
Europe, but on this continent, wholly inconsistent
both with the provisions of the treaty of Utrecht
and of that of Aix-la-Chapelle. Passing by the
revolutionary era, and coming down to the period
when legitimacy reigned triumphant, when the
earnest desire, and obvious interest of the various
nations combined to force upon them all the necessity of devising some plan of remodelling Europe,
which would be permanently secure against the
encroachments of dynastic ambition or revolutionary
passions, what, we may ask, has become of the
laborious work of the Congress of Vienna, although
the arrangements then made, with a view of securing a permanent peace, were mutually guaranteed
by all the powers, great and small 1 Greece torn
from Turkey, Belgium from Holland, Lombardy
from Austria, and the rest of Italy quietly taken
from its recognised princes, and handed over to the
house of Sardinia; the family of Napoleon, with
whom the Congrnss had declared it would never
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treat, and to exclude whom from the throne of
France at any future time, had been the anxious
desire of all who signed the treaty, now firmly reestablished in power-what are all these events, happening within the last fifty years, but a complete
commentary upon the folly and delusion of the belief,
that any treaties between foreign powers will last a
moment longer than any one of them may have the
inclination and force to break them 1 Let us think
of these things. Let us be grateful, when we remember that the Constitution alone has secured to
us the blessings of peace in the past; and let us
determine that peace shall be maintained in the
future, as indeed it only can be, by enforcing a universal recognition of its mild and beneficent sway.
"\Ve have endeavoured to show the incompatibility
of southern independence with any security to a proposed frontier, or with the enjoyment of the right of
navigation of the great rivers. Let us look for a
moment how our interests would be affected by the
possession of the forts on the southern coast, particularly those at Key West, the Tortugas, and Pensacola. It is impossible to find language more emphatic in. the expression of an opinion as to the value
of these forts, in a national point of view, than that
employed by Mr. Maury, late a captain in the United
States Navy. This man, with some pretensions to
science, which he employed in a great measure to
debauch public sentiment at the South, by inflaming
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it with golden dreams about the commerce of the

Amazon and alliances with the great slave empire
of Brazil, was ordered by the Secretary of War to
present his views on the general subject of national
defences. In an elaborate report, dated in August,
1851, he says: "A maritime enemy seizing upon
K ey West and the Tortugas could land a few heavy
guns from his ship, and make it difficult for us to
dislodge him; so long as he held that position, so
long would he control the commercial mouth of the
great Mississippi Valley. In that position he would
shut up in the Gulf whatever force inferior to his
own we might have there. He would prevent reinforcements sent to relieve it from Boston, New York,
and Norfolk, from entering the Gulf. Indeed, in a
war with England, the Tortugas and Key West being
in her possession, it might be more advisable, instead
of sending from our Atlantic dock-yards a fleet to
the Gulf, to send it over to the British Islands, and
sound the Irish people as to throwing off their allegiance." It was, as is well known, to secure these
important positions, commanding the entrance into
the Gulf, and the commerce of the Gulf itself, that
Florida was purchased from Spain. If such would
be the condition of things during actual hostilities,
how completely should our policy in time of peace
be governed by considerations as to the safety of our
foreign commerce with half the world, which these
strongholds in the hands of an enemy might com-
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pletely destroy. There is no need of statistics here.
The most unobservant is forced to ask, what is to
become of the commerce of our great maritime cities,
and of the thousand interests which are bound up
with it, in such an event 1 Let us learn wisdom from
the example of other nations in this matter. England, as is well known, at the termination of all the
great wars in Europe, has steadily refused any territorial acquisitions on that continent, preferring the
possession of certain strongholds in different quarters
of the globe, which would enable her to maintain in
every quarter her commercial supremacy, and thus
effectually control the policy of the world where her
own peculiar interests were likely to be affected.
Gibraltar, Corfu, Malta, the Cape of Good Hope,
Aden, Singapore, Hong-Kong, Jamaica, Bermuda,
Halifax, what are these but a standing menace to
other powers, that her commercial supremacy is to be
' maintained in all quarters, at all hazards 1 It is
barely conceivable that any government we might
have at the North, under any future combination of
events, would dare voluntarily to abandon these great
safeguards of our commerce. To such a suggestion,
the only answer could be that of Mr. Pitt to the
Spanish negotiators of the treaty of 1763, who asked
England to give up some trumpery claim about
curing fish on the coast of Newfoundland, and were
told that the minister would not dare to do it, even
if the Spaniards were in possession of the Tower of
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London. These positions are of course just as unportant to the Sou th as they are to us, for without
them the South could ha.ve no real independence.
We hold them nowi and while their possession, with
that of so many other vital points, convinces every
thoughtful man how much real progress we have
made in the course which, if persisted in, must
sooner or later bring our enemies to reason, we are
not likely to forego the present or future advantage
which their possession gives us.
Our capacity for successful resistance, in case of a foreign invasion, is a subject closely linked with our
material prosperity, and it would be vastly diminished by the establishment of southern independence. All our arrangements for national defence
have been made on the assumption of the perpetual
Union of the country. To what a condition would
we be reduced in our controversies with a foreign
· maritime power, should such a power be in possession of the forts on the southern coast, and of
Fortress Monroe in particular. We may rest assured
that the very first step by which a foreign power
would attempt to enforce its pretensions, in any
future disputes with this country, would be an
alliance with the South. Our disunion would then
have produced. its bitterest fruits, for we should have
the sad spectacle of a family strife, in which any
gain would fall into the hands of a stranger. The
utter inability of the South to maintain herself as

I
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a maritime power, and her most probable enemy
being one of the chief naval powers of the world,
would necessarily force her in the end to throw
herself into the arms of some E uropean nation for
protection and safety. It does not conflict with
this theory, that the South may be strong enough to
achieve her independence, because the efforts by
which that independence is gained, if it is ever
gained, must necessarily be exceptional, and cannot
be repeated; any government, even that of the
P rince of darkness himself, being preferable, as a
permanent system, to the rule which has existed
there for the last two years. We, in Pennsylvania,
have a very near interest in this matter. We cannot forget that on the two occasions in which our
territory has been threatened with invasion by a
foreign power, the enemy approached us through
Chesapeake Bay.
Those who have heedlessly
thought, that for the sake of peace the South might
be permitted to go, taking with it everything below
a certain line, without injury to us, would do well
to remember the battle of Brandywine, the consequent occupation of Philadelphia, and the winter at
V alley Forge-the darkest hour of the Revolution;
nor should they forget that other projected invasion
which we escaped, because its force was stayed by
the victories at North Point and Fort McHenry;
and that both of these invasions were attempted
because the Chesapeake was then, what it is pro-
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posed to make it again, by our own act, an open
highway for such an enterprise.
vVe might thus go on enumerating a vast array of
exclusively northern interests which would be inevitably sfricken down by the establishment of southern
independence. But they all cluster round the four
main supports of our whole system, which we have
examined, and we trust that enough has been said
to make it apparent that any hope of a permanent
peace, the security of our property, our capacity for
developing our natural resources, and our ability to
make ourselves strong at home and respected abroad,
depend upon our united determination to crush forever any such project.
These truths have long
appeared so self-evident to us, that we have sought
with no little curiosity to discover by what means
any northern man proposed to reconcile the obvious
conflict of the interests of every one· of his own
countrymen with this scheme of southern independence. We have never seen the propriety of recognising the South as a foreign power, so far as we can
remember, advocated in print by a northern man,
except in a recent production of Mr~ \V-illiam B.
Reed; and although Mr. Reed concerns himself very
little with the peculiar interests of his 0wn countrymen, whom he seems to regard with a strange con ..
tempt, yet he does favour recognition a8' a certain
mode of securing a desirable peace. There are many
things m this pamphlet of which we, eannot trust
3
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ourselves to speak as we feel, and we refer to it now
merely to show the unsatisfactory mode in which
Mr. Reed disposes of the all-important questions of
boundaries and the right of navigation.~ In regard
to the first, the only mode of settlement proposed,
"the only conceivable mode," is to allow each State
to settle the matter for itsel£ Kentucky and Maryland are to be permitted to secede without any
'
reference
to their constitutional relations to ourselves, supposing that political entity, called the
U nited States, still to survive; or to the injury
which their action might inflict upon our most
obvious material interests, supposing their territory,
in the event of a dissolution, essential to the safety
and security of the North. So in regard to the
other; the navigation of the rivers is to be left with
the " States concerned;" that is, a foreign country
controlling their course and outlet, we are to be .
satisfied that in peace and war that control will
always be exercised with the most exact and j ealous
rngard to our rights and interests. If we do not
assent to this peaceful mode of yielding up our most
vital interests, then we are threatened with an

* We differ from Mr. Reed in many things, but we cordially join him in
his protest against dragging the private life and personal motives of our
opponents into ·the arena of bitter party strife. Many, in these unhappy
days, have reached cone1usions directly opposite to those of Mr. Reed,
t hrough a path of duty beset with sore trials ; and their remembr ance of
't he sacrifir.es they h ave made of life-long friend ships, and even of tenderer
t ies, is too fre sh to permit them t o Judge, with indiscriminate harshness,
,the motives of those who may not ,a gr ee ;with them.
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aggressive war, to compel us to do so; a war the
horror of which is to be aggravated by a fierce strife
among ourselves, one party being supposed to be in
arms for the purpose of purchasing the poor privilege of joining the Confederacy, into whose blessed
fellowship we are now told we may not come even
as slaves. What is all this, but a most extraordinary
and char~cteristic commentary upon the peaceful
mode of settling the business 1 Everything the
South wants, as a matter of taste or of interest, must
be yielded, or we must give it up at the sword's
point; but we are to strike neither for the Constitution, which is set at naught, nor for the preservation
of those interests of which it is the only guaranty,
when they are imperilled by the arrogant pretensions
of the rebellion. Mr. Reed is certainly too accomplished a student of history, not to know that such
vital questions as those of boundaries, and the right
of navigation, were never settled in this way. The
appeal has been made to force, and force only can
decide it, a1~d that decision, when the people . of the
North are not misled and deluded by these vain
promises of peace, cannot for a moment be doubted.
Mr. Reed points us to Mr. Pitt's opposition to
the war of the Revolution. It is certainly not a
little amusing to find the man who had so intense
a hatred of the clail?-1 of any nation to govern
itself, as to arm the whole of Europe against
France, and to carry on a war from the prompt-
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ings of that hatred, which no one now denies
was "accursed, wicked, barbarous, cruel," and the
rest,-it is singular, we say, to find such a man
held up as the opponent of the American war,
upon any principle which can find favour ,vJ.th us.
The truth is, Mr. Pitt was seeking for office in
1 781 , and during the French Revolution he was
wielding despotic power. In what striking contrast
is this miserable shifting of political principle with
the last grand scene of the public life of Mr. Pitt's
illustrious father, the great Earl of Chatham! He
had been the early friend of the colonists, and the
earnest advocate of their claims, so long as the ad vocacy of those claims was consistent with the allegiance which he owed his sovereign. He came to·
the House of Lords, for the last time, a dying man.
"Yet never," says the historian, "was seen a figure
of rriore dignity; he appeared like a being of a superior species." He took his hand from his crutch,
and raised it, lifting his eyes towards heaven, and
said : "I thank God that I have · been enabled
to come here this day. I am old and infirm, have
one foot,-more than one foot-in the grave. I am
risen from my bed, to stand up in the cause of my
country." He gave the whole history of the American war, detailing the measures to which he had
objected, and the evil consequences which he had
foretold. He then expressed his indignation at the
idea, ·which he had heard had gone forth, of yield-
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mg up the sovereignty of America; he called for
vigorous and prompt exertion; he rejoiced that he
was still alive to lift up his voice against the first
dismemberment of this ancient and most noble monarchy. Well may the historian add: "Who does
not feel that, were the choice before him, he would
rather Ii ve that one triumphant hour of pain and
suffering, than through the longest career of thri ving and successful ·selfishness."*
The practical conclusions to which all the considerations we have urged, point, are, that the rebel theory
of independence necessarily makes certain claims
which are inconsistent not only with our security, but
with our national existence, with the safety of our
homes, and the enjoyment of our property, that these
claims are practically exclusive in their character, and
that as any compromise or arrangement, such as is
provided by the Constitution, is wholly rejected by
one party, and as we cannot depend upon the force
of treaties permanently to guarantee a satisfactory
settlement, nothing is left but an appeal to force, to
decide who shall control the great elementary conditions of national life on this continent. The appeal
being . thus made, the nature and character of the
settlement depend entirely upon the measure of the
success of our arms. This, as we have shown by
* Lord Chatham's example illustrates another matter: While he manfully supported a war which he had earnestly sought to prevent, he did
not hesitate to denounce most bitterly one of the means used by the Ministry to prosecute that war, namely, the employment of Indians as allies.
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historical examples, is the experience of all nations.
It betrays a gross ignorance of human nature to
suppose that sitting down quietly, and offering
term~ of peace, which are prompted by a desire for
conciliation, will ever cause the South to yield her
haughty pretensions to independence.
All such
overtures are looked upon as so many evidences of
weakness, and as was to be expected, their a~thors
have been treated with contempt and derision. The
South is under no such delusion, as some of our good
people here, as to a pacific settlement. They know
they are striving to gain what is just as important to
us, as it is to them, and in such a contest they know
that the sword must be the only arbiter. If, then,
these interests which we have discussed, are so essential to the North, and if they cannot co-exist with
southern independence, then we must fight it out
until some hope of a reasonable settlement rises out
of the fortunes of war. The result of the war in the
end, if we xemain united, is of course a foregone
conclusion, and with the hope of preservi1;1g that
unity of action which must result, sooner or later, in
an irresistible power, we have endeavoured to show
how the common· interest of every northern man is
bound up iri , the result.
May we venture, in an earnest spirit of conciliation, to make a few suggestions to each of the great
J?arties which now divide the country, and whose
concord in this matter is so essential 1
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The position of the Democratic party at this crisis
is one of great responsibility. _So far as we can now
judge, the practical solution of the matter is likely
to fall into their hands, they probably holding the
majority in the next Congress. While we have full
confidence in their anxiety to preserve our nationality, our fear is, that in their desire for peace, they
may be led into concessions which may weaken us,
and not accomplish the object for which they seek.
They should never forget, in all their measlues, that
already we hold positions in the southern territory
which, with the blockade of their coasts, the possession of the forts, and of the outlet of the Mississippi,
must practically settle the matter in the end in our
favour, even if we confine ourselves to maintaining
these positions without advancing a single step further. We keep what we take, at any rate, whereas
the aggressive war policy of the South has been, so
far, a miserable failure. Now, it is hardly to be
supposed, that the Democratic party could go before
the people of the North, and ask their consent to
the abandonment of such advantages. They are not
liJrnly to forget, that in a very dark hour of the war
of 1812, happily for them as supporters of that war,
news came that England, who had expressed great
anxiety for peace, proposed as the basis of a treaty,
to prohibit us from fortifying our northern frontier,
and from keeping a naval force on the great lakes,
while a right of navigation of the Mississippi should
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be secured to her, and that these monstrous pretensions, when they become known, united the whole
people in favour of the further prosecution of a war,
which had been quite as bitterly opposed as that in
which we are now engaged. The time has not yet
come for the application of the peaceful theories of
settlement by which the Democratic party hope to
heal our present troubles. That time will assuredly
come, if they are not too impatient; and if they
show to the South an united front, teaching them by
that sternest of all · masters-the fate of war-to
whose inexorable logic we must all in the end bow,
.that their choice is between safety within the protection of the Constitution, and, at the best, the barren sceptre ' of a worthless, because short-lived and
merely nominal independence.
"\Vith the same anxious desire for conciliation,
and with equal frankness, we propose to make a few
suggestions to the party now in power. Is it not
manifest that our hopes for success in this war
depend practically, not upon our waging it in sqcq a
way as to produce a conviction that its real object
is to remove an evil, which, however great, is not
likely to rouse any general enthusiasm at the North
for its destruction, but rather upon our finding some
policy, no matter what it is for the moment, upon
which we can all be united 1
as not this policy
most unexpectedly revealed to us after the fall of
Sumter, and did not the unity then happily estab-
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lished, receive the unanimous recognition of the
present Congress in July 18611 Have we not
become weaker just in proportion as we have wandered from the great, broad, catholic, policy then
announced 1 Whatever may be the effect of the
policy of the proposed emancipation of the negroes
upon the strength of the military resources of the
South, and we do not believe that it will be favourable to us, is not one thing certain, that at the
North, this policy as a military measure, (and this is
of course, the only ground upon which it can be
justified,) has produced most disastrous results 1 "\Vith
a view to the restoration of the Union, have we any
right to regard those in rebellion as aliens and
foreigners, because they choose to call themselves
such 1 While there is no instance in modern history in which a formidable insurrection has been
suppressed save by force, is there an instance in
which the crushing power of military success has
not been accompanied by the fullest promise of
amnesty, a complete recognition of the rights, civil
and religious, of the inhabitants, and a guaranty of
the absolute security of the property of those who
laid down their arms 1
e venture to make these
suggestions because we feel that the real obstacles
to the successful termination of this war &,re to be
found, not so much in the means of defence possessed by the rebels, as in the divisions which the
adoption of these new and doubtful theories intro-

,v
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duce among us. The only test of any measure, just
now, it seems to us, should be, how will it affect our
military operations 1 and where any policy, however
promising it may look as a theory, is new and
untried, and must inevitably divide us, then it should
be abandoned.
There are many loyal but desponding people who,
impatient of final results, forget to look at the progress we have already made towards the attainment
of our object. Our enemies understand this better
than ourselves, and the Richmond Examiner only
echoes the opinion of unprejudiced observers abroad,
when it says that another such year of progress, and
the Confederacy is doomed. "The Yankees keep
all they take,"-this is the true expression of our
real strength, and their relative weakness. Look
for a moment at the position of the South, as compared with that of France in the invasion of 1814.
Her enemies were mighty in number, but their
armies were made up of men who had been constantly defeated by the French in the battles of the
previous twenty years. · She was surrounded by sea
and land, as the South is, but the invaders had not
the advantages we possess, of holding, in the heart
of the enemy's country, most important strategical
points, and the great lines of communication; yet
did any one hope that even the mighty genius of
Napoleon, never more conspicuous than it was in
that campaign, could save France from final defeat
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against such odds 1 The result in the end, we cannot repeat it too often, is a simple question of
endurance; although if we were to settle to-morrow
with the South, on the basis of the uti possicletis- ·
keeping only what we now hold-their independence
as a nation would be a very unsubstantial shadow.
Look once more at the English experience. From
January 1807, to July 1809, eighteen months, English expeditions of importance met with failures,
more or less disastrous, at Constantinople, at Rosetta,
at the Island of Capri, at Buenos Ayres, and at
vValcheren. They lost the battle of Talavera, and
Sir John Moore's, army was driven out of Spain.
The only successes gained by the English in Europe
during these eighteen months, either military or
naval, were the capture of Copenhagen, Lord Cochrane's brilliant victory over the French fleet in
Basque Roads, and two battles in -P ortugal. But the
first of these events made Denmark and Russia open
enemies to England, and "\¥ ellington's victories were
rendered valueless by the subsequent retreat from
Talavera.*
* The want of elasticity in the American character is certainly very
remarkable. At one time, according to the newspaper s, every movement
was a victory; and at another, when these "organs of public opinion"
were in a different mood, events which have proved really our most important successes, were looked upon either as indecisive battles or as failures.
There are some people even now, who are not willing to believe that Antietam, which completely destroyed the unbounded h opes of the rebels in
the success of an aggressive war, ~as a victory. We are obliged to learn
from intercepted despatches, that the battle of Perryville, which at one
blow delivered the whole of Kentucky, was a disaster to the South; and
we find even the General-in-Chief telegraphing to Rosecrans that the
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There are some who fear that the disorganizing
spirit which has manifested itself in certain parts of
the country, may in the end penetrate to the army;
and there produce disastrous results. 'Ne confess
that we have too high an opinion of the intelligence
of our soldiers, and too profound a conviction of the
deliberate earnestness with which most of them have
entered upon this contest, to entertain any such
apprehensions.
Brave men have an instinctive
hatred of traitors and cowards, and are quite prepared both for the fire . of the open enemy, and for
that of the more insidious foe "in the rear." Our
soldiers are fighting for an idea,-the sacred idea of
country, and are not to be drawn aside from pressing
onwards to the end, because some of the means
adopted by the government may be distasteful to
them. Certainly the most ungracious aspect which
the disloyal opposition to the government presents,
finding fault with everything that is done, because
some great mistakes may have been made, is the
rebel accounts confirm his own report of his victory. How differently
they manage such things in France! Here is part of a song which was
· written and sung with "rapturous applause," in one of the darkest hours
of her history.
"Le coq Fran<;ais est le coq de la gloire,
Par le revers il n'est point abattu,
11 chante fort s'il gagne la victoire,
Encor plus fort quand il est bien battu.
Le coq Franc;ais est le coq de la gloire
'l'oujours chanter est sa grande vertu;
Est il imprudent, est il sage,
C'est ce qu'on ne peut definir,
Mais qui ne perd jamais courage,
Se rend maitre de l'avenir."
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implied censure it casts upon our armies in the field.With singular unanimity, we have urged our noble
defenders to rush to the rescue of the country in
peril, and they have gone forth, men of all parties,
and of every shade of opinion, to take our places in
the great battle. They at, least have "fought the
good fight," with a single eye to the glory and
honour of their country. It is impossible to honour
these heroic men too highly, or to cherish them too
tenderly. ,vhile there is a spark of patriotism or
gratitude remaining in our national life,-while there
is a sentiment of national glory or national honour
left to preserve us from that political decay which
our senseless discord must breed,-while there is a
remembrance of the dauntless- valour and noble selfsacrifice which charactei·ise the army,-while there is
a tender reverence for the memory of the martyrs
who have fallen, we s\all shrink from doing or
saying ~nything which may weaken the faith of our
soldiers in the holy cause in which they peril their
lives. If the time ever comes when political passions
shall so blind us, as to tempt us to obtain our ends
by efforts to demoralize our armies, God Almighty
help us! for we shall then have richly deserved the
fate which He has reserved for the nations visited in
His anger.
There are some whose scruples it is impo·ssible not
to respect, who are lukewarm in the support of the
war, because they think they see in certain acts of
violence done to those principles of constitutional
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restraint which lie at the basis ot our system, a tendency which, if carried out, would destroy our barriers against despotic power. To such men, the
restoration of the Union, or the subjugation of the
South, would be dearly purchased by the sacrifice of
the safeguards of our own political rights. We
think all such fears exaggerated, still it cannot be
doubted that they exercise a pernicious influence.
No one who has been brought up to revere the
great principles of constitutional liberty can regard
with favour what is called "military necessity," or
raison d' etat, still ·it is clear, that there are rare
contingencies in which, like the law of self-preservation, it must be invoked and irregularly applied.
No nation ha_s ever gone to war without violating
in some essential manner ·the well-settled rules
which govern it in times of peace, and the dictatorship of the Romans, -and the suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus, are only different ways of recognising the same great necessity. One of the great evils
of war, is that it requires for its prosecution such a
concentration of power in the hands of the Executive
that there is very great danger of abuse in its exercise. After all, however, we must never forget that
in this unhappy condition of things our choice is
reduced to a choice of evils. Shall we submit to a
temporary despotism now, in order that we may be
saved from one tenfold more fearful in the future 1
It is satisfactory to find that history does not show
any permanent ill effects upon the attachment of
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a people to free institutions, as the result of war.
On the contrary, the activity and progress in every
department which characterize the present generation in Europe, can readily be traced to the
effects, direct or remote, of the wars which grew
out of the events of the French Revolution. Yet,
in England, good men and wise men, despaired
not only of their country, but of the great cause
of civilization and liberty. In that country, "in
the early part of the war with revolutionary F rance,
if a man was known to be a Reformer, he was
constantly in danger of being arrested, an d even
the confidence of domestic life was violated ; no
opponent of the government was safe under his own
roof against the tales of eavesdroppers and the gossip of servants; not only were the most strenuous
attempts made to silence the press, but the booksellers were so constantly prosecuted, that they did
not dare to publish a work if its author was obnoxious to the Court. Indeed, whoever opposed the
government, was proclaimed an enemy to his country. Every popular leader was in personal danger,
and every popular assemblage was dispersed either by
threats or by military execution." "And yet," adds
Mr. Buckle, from whose work we have taken this
gloomy picture, "_such is the force of liberal opinions,
when they have once taken root in the popular
mind, that notwithstanding all this, it was found
impossible to stifle them, or even to prevent their
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increase. In a few years that generation began to
pass away, a better one succeeded in its place, and
the system of tyranny fell to the ground. And thus
it is that in all countries which are even tolerably
free, every system must fall if it opposes the march
of opinions, and gives shelter to maxims and institutions repugnant to the spirit of the age. In this
sort of contest the ultimate result is never doubtful.
The vigour of public opinion is not exposed to casualties; it is unaffected by the laws of mortality; it
does not flourish to-day and decline to-morrow; and
so far from depending upon the lives of individual
men, it is governed by large general causes, which
are in short periods scarcely seen, but on a comparison of long periods are found to outweigh all
other considerations."
Let us then, who have offered on the altar of our
country, our treasure and the blood of our brethren,
not hesitate even to make a temporary sacrifice of
our constitutional rights, if the success of the great
cause in which we are engaged renders so cruel a
necessity apparent. For with success comes peace,
not a peace which would prove a short-lived and
deceptive truce, but a peace which would revive in
all their former vigour the guarantees of personal
rights, and which, even if it did- not restore the
Union as it was, would at least secure to us those
conditions of safety which are as the very lifeblood of our existence.
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